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Abstract
We use the behavior of inflation among Eurozone countries to provide in-
formation about the degree of credibility of the European Central Bank (ECB)
since 2008. We define credibility along three dimensions–official target credibil-
ity, cohesion credibility and anchoring credibility–and show in a new econometric
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The 2007/8 global financial crisis exposed large inconsistencies among member countries
of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Significant inflation differentials compounded
over time to generate large differences in real exchange rates and current account imbal-
ances, raising doubts about the viability of the union. This suggests that central bank
credibility, at least in a monetary union, is multi-dimensional and the usual measure
of credibility, normally interpreted as the commitment to follow well-articulated and
transparent rules and policy goals (Bordo and Siklos, 2014), may not suffice.
We use the behavior of inflation among the Eurozone countries to provide informa-
tion about the degree of credibility of the European Central Bank (ECB). Our model
offers two distinct advantages: first, the setup is able to econometrically extract infor-
mation about inflation expectations from observed inflation data alone, that is, without
any reference to survey data or market price-based measures. This allows for a simple
single-equation specification, which is typically more robust to specification error than
a system of equations.
Second, our econometric model has the innovative feature that discrete changes in
the marginal effects of information are endogenous. In our setup some explanators in
regressions can seem to be insignificant most of the time but may suddenly become
highly significant, namely when agents revise their beliefs and reweight the importance
attached to alternative sources of information.1
We generalize Lucas (1972), showing how private sector inference affects the time
series properties of inflation. Within this inferential expectations (IE) framework (Men-
zies and Zizzo, 2009) we define three dimensions of credibility - official target credibility,
cohesion credibility and anchoring credibility - and show theoretically as well as empiri-
cally that a central bank need not be equally credible along all dimensions. Estimation
for the Euro zone reveals that since the crisis, official target and cohesion credibility
have been maintained but at a cost of detioriating anchoring credibility.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the following section we define and discuss three
dimensions of central bank credibility. Section 3 reviews the theory of inferential ex-
pectations (IE) and derives a new Phillips curve, the IE Phillips curve, based on the
classic Lucas islands model. In section 4 we show how the IE Phillips curve relates
to credibility, which serves as the basis for the econometric work in section 5. This is
followed by a discussion and conclusion in Section 6.
2 Three Dimensions of Credibility
Credibility is a central concern for central banks, both in theory and in practice. Aca-
demic interest in credibility can be attributed, in no small measure, to the rational
expectations revolution. As Blinder (2000) points out, under certain assumptions, in-
cluding rational expectations, a fully credible central bank is able to disinflate entirely
costlessly, without any loss in output, which is to say, the sacrifice ratio is zero. Even
without rational expectations, if expectations matter, a central bank’s credibility will
1This feature ties in nicely with Scharnagl and Stapf (2011) who, by looking at option-implied prob-
ability density functions of future inflation, point out that, “a high variation in inflation expectations













influence how its monetary policy actions affect both the real and nominal sides of the
economy. Early work on central bank credibility was motivated by the problem of an
inflation bias, as in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a,b).
Concern for the inflation bias has been largely superseded by a concern to minimize
the stabilization bias, which is integral to monetary policy analysis in New Keynesian
models.2
A large literature asks how credibility relates to central bank transparency, reputa-
tion and independence (e.g. Faust and Svensson, 2001) and how it can be built and
maintained. Over the past 15 years or so, a consensus has emerged that inflation tar-
geting is the best way, at least in practice, for a central bank to build and maintain
credibility. (See, for example, Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997, Svensson, 1997, Bernanke
et al., 1999., and Walsh, 2009.)
The interest in and concern for credibility is palpable also in policy making circles.
Central bankers are acutely aware of the need to influence and control the private
sector’s expectations as these will determine how effective and costly their policy choices
are, now and in the future. Central bank credibility is considered a hard won asset that,
under no circumstances, should be squandered.
In a thorough historical analysis Bordo and Siklos (2014), citing Cukierman (1986),
define central bank credibility as a commitment to follow well-articulated and trans-
parent rules and policy goals. In particular, credibility refers to the extent to which
the public believes that a shift in policy has taken place when, indeed, such a shift has
actually occurred. They interpret credibility in terms of inflation performance:
“Credibility is a flow like variable that changes as observed inflation is
seen to deviate from a time varying inflation objective, which need not be
explicit or publicly announced. Credibility is also partially determined by
the relative importance the central bank attaches to real and nominal objec-
tives. Regular economic shocks and the manner in which the central bank
manipulates monetary policy dictate how credibility evolves over time. [...]
As Cukierman (1986, page 5) again points out ‘. . . the ability of monetary
policymakers to achieve their future objectives depends on the inflationary
objectives of the public. These inflationary expectations depend, in turn on
the public’s evaluation of the credibility of the monetary policy makers. . . ’”
[p. 5, our italics]
Credibility is a complicated and subtle concept. The public is well served by a
simple metric so that it can hold the central bank accountable and optimally set prices
and wages. Thus, Bordo and Siklos and many others use the gap between observed
inflation and an inflation objective or target. The wider this gap is or the longer it is
sustained, the less credible a central bank is thought to be.
This measure of credibility is both intuitive and sufficiently transparent to be of use
to the public but it unnecessarily limits credibility to a single dimension.
What if a central bank announces an official target yet actual inflation settles around
a constant level different from the official target (the unofficial target) and inflation
2See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) for an early review and Gali (2015) for an extensive overview













expectations become anchored to this unofficial target? The gap between observed
inflation and the unofficial target will remain small and short-lived, but is it appropriate
to state that the central bank is credible?
When commentators refer to central bank credibility, or well anchored expectations,
they typically assume that the unofficial and official inflation targets coincide. But there
exist more nuanced discussions. Fuhrer (2011) provides a good example:
“well-anchored inflation expectations require two things from the central
bank. First, the central bank must have an inflation goal [target] that is
known to the private agents in the economy, and second, the central bank
must move its policy rate in a way that systematically pushes the inflation
rate toward that goal.” (p. 474)
Fuhrer’s first requirement corresponds to our official target credibility, while his
second corresponds to our anchoring credibility. Yet he only considers well anchored
expectations to refer to a combination of the two when he refers to pushing inflation
‘towards that goal’ (our italics), rather than some other inflation target.3
And consider the central bank of a monetary union whose mandate is to target an
average rate of inflation for the entire union. Is a central bank which presides over a
union in which all member countries have the same inflation rate more credible than
a central bank whose member countries have diverging inflation rates but the same
average? The latter may not be the central bank’s ‘fault’ but diverging inflation rates
complicate the central bank’s core mission of targeting average inflation, even more
so when the central bank has other mandates such as low unemployment or financial
stability.
In a monetary union such as the Euro zone persistent inflation differentials lead
to significant real imbalances, which may ultimately compromise the central bank’s
ability to meet its inflation target and even threaten the entire union and existence
of its central bank. This is why Euro accession requires entrants to meet an inflation
criterion individually. Indeed, it is not possible for two countries to join the European
monetary union if their average inflation rate is close to the ECB target but their
individual inflation rates significantly deviate. (See Darvas and Wolff, 2014.)
When the survival of the central bank as an institution is uncertain, labelling it
credible merely because on average inflation remains close to the target seems to miss a
very important aspect of monetary policy, namely that the policy regime is stable and
thus credible in the sense that it will survive. From the perspective of an individual
Euro member country, the survival of the union, or at least the country’s continued
membership in the union, is arguably central to any projections about future inflation.
Consider two scenarios in which the average Euro area inflation rate is the same but in
scenario 1 the individual country inflation rates barely differ from each other, whereas
in scenario 2 individual country inflation rates differ widely. In scenario 2, for a firm
3See also Demertzis et al. (2008). Two notable exceptions, which separately consider the degree to
which expectations are anchored to a constant and the gap between that constant and the official target,
see Mehrotra and Yetman (2018a,b) and Kowalczyk, Lyziak and Stanislawska (2013). Their focus is
entirely different, however. The former proposes an alternative measure of inflation anchoring which
uses multiple-horizon fixed-event forecasts while the latter is concerned with forecast distributions













or household in a union member country, any policy, or announcement, by the ECB
directed at fulfilling its core mission of keeping the average Euro area inflation rate at,
or near, the official target will ring hollow, if there is a real possibility that the member
country, which already has, say, a high inflation rate, will leave the ECB and pursue its
own monetary policy. Indeed, this would especially be the case if the reason for leaving
the Euro was that its inflation rate was high and difficult to bring down (though this
is hypothetical – we are not claiming this for the Eurozone now). This must affect
national inflation expectations.
This seems plausible, whether or not the final decision of a member country to
remain within the union is outside the ECB’s control – and, more generally, whether
or not country-specific policies that create the divergence in national inflation rates,
and thus increase the probability of a union dissolution, are beyond the ECB’s direct
control. It seems to us that what really matters for decision makers in the member
countries is the extent to which ECB policies and announcements, given the constraints
a monetary union imposes, are reliable indicators for the formation of domestic inflation
expectations. This issue was already anticipated not long after the ECB’s inception.
Expressing concern that the ECB presidents of national central banks have a majority
in the Governing Council, The Economist argued that:
“The Governing Council is supposed to set interest rates according to
conditions in the euro area as a whole, but there is a risk that national gov-
ernors will be unduly influenced by conditions in their home country. Small
countries may also carry undue weight in the system... A weak centre, com-
bined with strong national interests, could create conflicts that undermine
the whole system’s credibility.” [quoted in de Haan et al., 2004, p. 5]
The idiosyncratic behaviour of national inflation rates, which are affected by na-
tional variables, such as wages, domestic competitiveness conditions, etc., is also the
primary motivation for van der Cruijsen and Demertzis (2011), whose results clearly
indicate that national inflation expectations behave differently than Euro area inflation
expectations.
Diverging inflation rates are, however, not only a problem for a monetary union
such as the Euro zone, where members are sovereign states, but also for large, diverse
countries such as Australia, Canada or the USA. These countries typically have other
mechanisms to counter diverging inflation rates, such as fiscal transfer systems and high
labor mobility, but the regional disparities do compromise their central banks’ abilities
to deliver on their (multiple) mandates.
We make these distinctions explicit and define three dimensions of credibility:
1. A central bank has official target credibility if underlying inflation is equivalent
to the announced target. If underlying inflation settles at another level, then this
constitutes an unofficial inflation target.4
4There is a clear difference between credibility and predictability, with credibility implying pre-
dictability but not the other way around. Consider the following example: Peter, every time he is
invited to Bob’s house for dinner, promises to be on time but shows up an hour late. His behavior
will be perfectly predictable (at least to Bob) but his promise to be on time will be deemed lacking
credibility. Of course, the likely response will be for Bob to invite Peter an hour earlier, anticipating














2. Cohesion credibility captures the degree of inflation divergence among the mon-
etary union’s regions. Little inflation divergence among regions/countries means
that the monetary union has fewer real imbalances within it, making the monetary
union more likely to survive and monetary policy thus more stable and credible.
3. Anchoring credibility refers to the degree of attachment of price setters’ inflation
expectations to the central bank’s inflation target, whether official or unofficial.
Cohesion credibility is one of our innovations in this paper. We find it has been
maintained throughout the past decade, in part because the 2007/8 global financial
crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis forced the ECB and other
policy makers in the union to adopt policies that attenuated the real exchange rate
misalignments. Had these extraordinary policy measures not been taken, the official
asseveration by the ECB and the member countries’ leaders of the union’s survival (and
thus, implicitly, its ability to meet its inflation target) would have lacked credibility.5
3 An Inferential Expectations Phillips Curve
3.1 Inferential Expectations (IE)
In the coming sections we will investigate the issue of central bank credibility using a
Phillips curve based on Inferential Expectations (IE). Economists have long emphasized
the importance of expectations for macroeconomic outcomes, and IE is one departure
from Rational Expectations (RE) which nests RE as a special case. Under IE, agents
form expectations as though they are doing a hypothesis test.
Informally, agents have an opinion about the state of the world. It could be some-
thing as simple as ‘the ECB is targeting 2 per cent inflation’. Then they make imperfect
observations on any variable that bears on that statement, such as a member’s increas-
ingly precarious fiscal position which might tempt the authorities to inflate away debt,
but they do not change beliefs with every adverse observation. Instead, they hold
onto their opinion about the state of the world despite the cumulated evidence. When
so much evidence cumulates against their opinion that it appears unsustainable, they
swiftly abandon it.
More formally, their maintained belief is their null hypothesis (H0), their measure
of cumulated evidence is a test statistic, and their rejection region is defined by a single
significance level α, which may be drawn from a distribution. If they reject H0, we
assume they switch to RE. It follows that in the special case where α is always unity,
IE agents continually reject the null and embrace RE. This is the basis for the earlier
claim that IE nests RE.
IE has two very plausible implications. First, agents can notice data without chang-
ing their minds, which is a feature of a hypothesis test when someone is in possession
5Clearly, the interdependence between monetary and fiscal policy is crucial, especially in a monetary
union of sovereign nations with limited provisions for cross-border fiscal transfers. There is a large
literature on the optimal structure of a monetary union, with an emphasis on the different implications
of fiscal versus monetary dominance. (For an early overview of this debate in the context of the
European Monetary Union see Beetsma and Debrun, 2004.) We will not weigh into this discussion,













of information that speaks against a null, but the test statistic falls short of a rejection
region. That this is plausible can be seen from this quote by Alan Greenspan about
the build-up to the subprime mortgage crisis:
“While I was aware a lot of these [sub prime] practices were going on, I
had no notion of how significant they had become until very late. I didn’t
really get it until very late in 2005 and 2006.”
Alan Greenspan CBS “60 minutes” 16 Sept. 2007
The second implication of IE is that a relatively small bit of information can be the
proverbial ‘straw that breaks the camel’s back’. In a hypothesis test this occurs if a
relatively uninformative observation nonetheless takes a test statistic into a rejection
region. Under RE, which in this case equates to Bayes rule, the flip in beliefs (from
complete belief of the null to complete belief of the alternative) can only occur if the
information is extremely informative.
For the purposes of comparison, we will mimic a switch in beliefs from H0 at time t
to H1 at time t+1 using Bayes rule. This is equivalent to holding H1 with a vanishingly
small probability ε in period t, which becomes our prior, and then with probability 1−ε
in t + 1. We then let ε approach zero to approximate ‘believing’ H0 in t and H1 in
t + 1.6 If the last parcel of information is It+1, then Bayes rule says it must be highly
informative:7
Pr (H1 | It+1) =
(
Pr (It+1 | H1)
εPr (It+1 | H1) + (1− ε) Pr (It+1 | H0)
)
ε = 1− ε
=⇒ lim
ε→0
Pr (It+1 | H1)








As well as having plausible implications, IE has a number of plausible micro-
foundations. Carroll (2003) shows, using household survey data, that a parsimonious
and tractable model of expectations is ’infrequent rational expectations’ where the ra-
tionality can be thought of as coming from consulting ‘experts’ who are convey the
rational expectation to the agent. Clearly, this is equivalent to a hypothesis where one
either holds to a belief (H0), or forms a rational expectation (H1).
The second micro-foundation comes from the decision-theoretic framework of Cohen
et al. (2018). Agents conduct an inference problem with switching costs, and a cost of
not switching associated with holding onto incorrect beliefs. The optimally generated
band of inaction balances the two costs, and turns out to be equivalent to a confidence
interval. This makes the band of inaction describable as a two-sided hypothesis test—in
other words IE is an ‘as if’ theory of optimal decision making.
In view of what we consider to be reasonable implications and foundations, our
modelling strategy is an extension of the IE work on central banking by Henckel et al.
(2011). We treat beliefs about the central bank inflation target as a null belief in a
6It can be shown that if H1 is believed with ε1 in period t and 1− ε2 in t+ 1, then the result goes
through even if ε1 and ε2 approach zero at different rates.
7In the event of quasi-Bayesian (under)adjustment, where the bracketed term in the first line is
raised to a power less than unity, it can be shown that the last bit of information must be even more













hypothesis test, where H0 corresponds to the official target value. In the case of the
ECB we will treat this value as 2 percent.8
We posit an IE Phillips curve of the following form:
π = βH0 + (1− β)E [π] +
∑
i
γiXi + η. (1)
Aggregate inflation π depends on the inferential expectations of price setters, a fraction
β of whom fail to reject H0 and a fraction 1 − β of whom reject H0 and work out the
rational expectation of inflation, based on (1). The variable H0 is the value inflation
takes under the null, which in our analysis is 2 percent for the ECB. The Xi are other
explanators, variables like the output gap, which are zero in the steady-state. The
estimation error η is assumed to be i.i.d. We can simplify the above equation by noting
that, when agents adopt rational expectations, they can use (1) to solve for E [π]:
E [π] = βH0 + (1− β)E [π] +
∑
i






which can be substituted into (1) to obtain the IE Phillips curve:





Xi + η. (2)
Equation (2) is noteworthy because the marginal impacts of the Xi’s depend upon
the proportion of agents that are anchored onto H0. The more they abandon the
inflation target (the lower β) the more they must rely on other variables for their
expectations, which magnifies their marginal impacts. Thus, a testable implication
of the IE Phillips curve is that all the coefficients on the Xi’s will rise by the same
proportion when agents abandon the null. It is a noteworthy feature of many crises
that previously unimportant variables can become more important, and (2) is a new
(and testable) model of why this might be so.9
3.2 Steady-State β
A key parameter in (2) is β and we now characterize it both in, and out of, the steady-
state. By steady-state we mean that the equation error and the Xi’s in (2) are zero,
which implies π = H0 for any value of β; that is, the value of inflation under the null
hypothesis is the rational expectation. We can now work out the steady-state value of
β knowing that any value of β is consistent with a steady-state for π, and that the null
belief about inflation is true in the steady-state.
8The European Central Bank (ECB) ’aims at inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the
medium term’. (http://www.ecb.int/mopo/html/index.en.html) We adopt 2% as the target in our
estimation.
9Thus our model adopts the last three recommendations of the Rebuilding Macroeconomic Theory
Program (Vines and Wills, 2018): the inclusion of financial frictions (which we do not do), limiting
RE, adding heterogeneous agents and having more realistic microfoundations (like Carroll 2003). The
project, described in Vol. 34, Issue 1, of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy, is a summary of the
written and verbal contributions by the volume’s many authors. A comment that the econometric














Because the population of agents forming inflation expectations is heterogeneous,
we assume that agents take an i.i.d. draw of a test size α from a common density for
α. For example, a group of ‘classical statisticians’ might draw α = 0.05 and 0.10 with
equal probability. Since H0 is true in the steady-state, then β must be the proportion of
agents believing the null under H0, which is 1−α if α is a single number and 1−E [α]
if α has a distribution.10
All that is required to calculate steady-state β is the mean of the density of α.
For example, our ‘classical statisticians’ have E [α] = 0.05/2 + 0.10/2 and hence β =
1 − 0.075 = 0.925. However, based on the wide range of α’s elicited in Menzies and
Zizzo (2012) we here assume α is uniform across support (0, 1) implying E [α] = 0.5
and β = 0.5.
When we later run a regression like (2) it will be impossible to separately identify
the γ’s and β. However, if we assume the model is in a steady-state prior to the shock
(the 2008 crisis) we can infer both γ and, if we attribute any rise in the estimated
coefficient to β, the new value of β.
3.3 Non-Steady-State β: An IE Lucas Islands Model
We now characterize β out of the steady-state using an extension of Lucas (1972, 1973)
to capture the idea that agents in individual countries face a signal extraction prob-
lem when disentangling domestic inflationary impulses from Euro-wide inflationary im-
pulses. It is a fitting framework for the European context, where agents are constantly
processing pan-European information about the state of European institutions, infla-
tionary pressure and fiscal sustainability, alongside relevant national information. Using
IE we obtain a function that is very close to Lucas’s (1973) form, but with a more re-
alistic information requirement.
Suppose a country, say Italy, draws a country inflation target πCB from the Euro-




. Agents in Italy have an interest
in knowing the true value of πCB but only observe a noisy signal of it, π = πCB + v
with v ∼ N(0, σ2v).11 Assuming πCB and v are independent, π ∼ N
(





from which a standard Bayesian solution follows:
10In more detail, we make the standard assumption that the choice of test size and the compiling of
evidence, which gives the p-value, are independent, viz. fPα = fP fα, where f is a probability density














Under the null, the density of any p-value is uniform, since under H0, Pr(P < x) = x for any test size
x. We recognize this as a cdf, namely FP (x) = x, implying fP (x) = 1. Integrating the bracketed term




(1− α) fαdα = 1− E [α] .
11It is most natural to think of v being related to direct measures of the Italian inflation rates, or
price components of the CPI. However, it can be anything that makes it hard to see what the central
bank is actually doing by adding noise to inflation. For example, if the spectre of fiscal profligacy




























If inflation rates are replaced with price levels and the shocks are redefined as money
and idiosyncratic (“island”) cost shocks, we obtain the familiar ’Lucas Islands’ (1973)
solution.
The solution (3) requires knowledge of all variances, whereas it is arguably more
realistic to assume that agents do not know σ2CB. In spite of agents knowing less, the
IE solution has the same qualitative properties as the Lucas solution. Remarkably, the
coefficents on the null and alternative hypotheses are functions of the same weights in
(3), and the signs of the partial derivatives with respect to these weights are identical.
The IE solution begins with the hypotheses:
H0 : π
CB = πEU (4)
H1 : π
CB = E [π] ,
which is to say that each agent anchors πCB onto the known constant πEU = 2% until
they have sufficient evidence against it based on the noisy signal π. At that point they
form a rational expectation of inflation, or ask an expert to do so (Carroll, 2003). As
above, we assume that in a setting where a proportion β believes the null, the aggregate
belief relevant for a country’s Phillips curve is the convex combination of the beliefs
weighted by β and 1− β, namely βπEU + (1− β)E [π]. We now demonstrate that β is





As identified in (4), the null belief πCB = πEU is equivalent to σ2CB = 0 and so the
only variance relevant for the hypothesis test is σ2v .

















































The χ2 distribution is shown in figure 1:













The probability that H0 is believed is β, the shaded area. It is less than the area
up to χ21,α, namely 1 − α. As the ratio σ2v/ (σ2CB + σ2v) rises, the shaded area rises,





To reiterate, the IE solution delivers identical signs of the partials with respect to
σ2CB and σ
2
v as the classic model but without the informational burden of agents having
to know the economy-wide variance σ2CB. The IE model is thus more reasonable in terms
of calculation—a frequentist test is simpler than a signal extraction problem—and in
terms of the assumed information known by the agents.
3.4 The Credibility Cube
The IE Phillips curve can be used to discuss and estimate credibility in the Euro area
following the tumultuous events after 2008. Since we are not in possession of the dis-
tribution of p-values or chosen test sizes for European countries, we will proceed by
estimating an IE Phillips curve and testing for changes in coefficients that might signal
an erosion of anchoring credibility. That is, if the explanators for inflation rise propor-
tionally in unison, it may signal (according to (2)) that β is falling. Furthermore, esti-
mating across a panel of Euro-area countries will allow us to see if underlying inflation
rates cluster around the 2 percent target (cohesion credibility), and, if the underlying
inflation rates differ from the official 2 percent target (official target credibility).
We can represent our econometric answers to these question on a three dimensional
‘credibility cube’ (figure 2):
(Insert Figure 2 here)
The official target credibility axis lies along the bottom left-hand side. Inflation
equal to the official target gives maximum credibility.
The cohesion credibility axis is shown at the bottom right-hand side: all countries
having the same inflation rate (σ2CB = 0) gives maximum credibility.
The anchoring credibility axis lies along the closest edge. When β, the proportion
of agents believing the null, equals 100% (at point 0 in figure 1) there is maximum
credibility. As we rise along the vertical anchoring credibility axis, β approaches zero
and there is declining credibility.
At point 0 the central bank has maximum credibility on all three dimensions. At the
top-most point on the page, diagonally opposite from 0, the central bank has minimum
credibility on all three dimensions.
4 IE in a Country Specific Phillips Curve






t + γ2et + ηt, (5)













where πt denotes four-quarter-ended inflation, expressed in percent, in period t, π
e
t
expected inflation, πent is energy price inflation, et is marginal cost, and ηt is an i.i.d.
shock.
This is a Lucas supply function, augmented with a term for energy prices πent ,
which is important empirically for Europe. We are not interested in the determinants
of et in general equilibrium and therefore assume that et has a zero mean but we leave
unspecified whether it is auto-correlated. It is straightforward to use a mapping of real
marginal cost to output or unemployment to rewrite (5) so that et becomes an output
gap.
There is no forward-looking inflation expectation term, as in the New Keynesian
Phillips curve, since the IE Phillips curve was derived differently. Prices are assumed
to be perfectly flexible, providing firms with the opportunity to set prices anew in each
period. Any price stickiness arises endogenously due to informational and cognitive
costs among price setters, rather than imposing a Calvo (1983) or Rotemberg (1982)
type restriction. This is broadly in the spirit of the more recent research on rational
inattention (Sims, 2003, and Woodford, 2009).13
Instead, as above, expected inflation is the consensus belief of experts about the
true inflation target of the central bank, πCB. In particular, we assume that in each
Eurozone country a continuum of experts, after studying the economy and the central
bank, separately guess πCB. These within-country guesses are averaged and form a
consensus belief which substitutes for πe in the first term on the RHS of (5) in each
country’s Phillips curve.14
Consistent with the model of Carroll (2003), we assume that price setters have
inferential expectations (IE), that is, they guess πe using a statistical hypothesis test.
We further assume that each individual price setter has her own significance level αi
and p-value and that a hypothesis test is conducted with a draw from fPα.
In many circumstances it might be natural to assume that the IE test statistic is
some function of the gap between observed inflation and its target (here, the 2% ECB
‘target’). For example, this was the assumption of Henckel et al. (2011). However,
for the recent sovereign debt crisis, it is both realistic and convenient to assume that
the danger to credibility does not stem from the recent inflation history. It is realistic
because inflationary concerns relate to the doubts about the fiscal sustainability of the
Euro venture itself (Borgy et al., 2011),15 and it is convenient because the independence
13The empirical success of forward-looking expectations is mixed. While forward-looking terms have
been shown to have some explanatory power in some cases, especially in more structural models such
as Smets and Wouters (2007, 2010), in many others they are statistically insignificant or relatively
small, compared to backward-looking expectations. See Rudd and Whelan (2007) and Gaĺı, Gertler
and Lopez-Salido (2005).
The New Keynesian Phillips curve, when estimated under the assumption of full-information rational
expectations, has several shortcomings, including its inability to adequately deal with lags, instability
and structural breaks, its low out-of-sample prediction power, and its sensitivity to the economic gap
variable used. See Coibion et al. (2017) for a deeper discussion and a Phillips curve model that tries
to overcome these problems by directly including inflation expectations survey data.
14When (5) is modelled for the Euro area, the ‘islands’ of the ’Lucas Islands’ (1973) model are the
expectations in each country.
15We do not need to assume this however; inflationary concerns could be due to a range of eco-














of β and lagged inflation makes our estimation below simpler.16
There would be no inference problem for the experts in the model described in (5)
if πCB were common knowledge and credible. However, it is possible that the central
bank has lost partial control of the monetary policy process and that the link between
national inflation rates and the European Central Bank’s policy setting is weakened.
For individual Eurozone countries this is as if the monetary authority targeted a value
of inflation different from the official value. Using the notion of official target credibility,
as previously defined, we denote the announced (official) inflation target as π∗, and the
unofficial inflation target, the level of inflation around which actual inflation tends to
settle, as πCB.17 To the extent that πCB differs from π∗, official target credibility is
eroded.
Assuming heterogeneity in inflation expectations across countries is justified by the
strongly divergent behavior of national inflation rates within the Eurozone despite a
common monetary policy. Figure 3 shows inflation rates (four-quarter-ended) for Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain for March 2001-December 2014. We
also show the European rate for comparison. Not only do inflation rates differ substan-
tially across countries but their first derivatives sometimes have opposite signs. Over
a long period, like a decade or more, an inflation differential of, say, one percentage
point cumulates to a large price level differential. Of course, as all Eurozone countries
share the same currency, differences in domestic price levels constitute relative price
changes. Because these relative price differences may persist for decades, driving large
real exchange rate differences, organizations like the OECD continue to compile and
speak of national inflation rates.18
(Insert Figure 3 here)
As discussed earlier, in the IE framework it is a common convention to adopt rational
expectations as the alternative hypothesis (Menzies and Zizzo, 2009; Henckel et al.,
2011). Adopting that convention at a country level means the null hypothesis for
price-setting agents in, say, Italy, is that the ECB really is pursuing πCB = 2% in
that country, but if experts do not believe this, they work out E [π]. Algebraically, πe
becomes βπCB + (1− β)E [π] and we solve the model to obtain a form like (2).
In the next section we estimate an IE Phillips curve for each country in the Euro
area to describe any changes in the three dimensions of credibility since 2008. The
econometric model maps onto the three dimensions of credibility as follows:
• Official target credibility refers to the proximity of targeted inflation to the an-
nounced target π∗. In our estimation framework a natural measure for this is the





16The dependence between the proportion of agents holding onto beliefs and lagged values of the
dependent variable makes the β in the chartists/fundamentalists framework (Ahrens and Reitz, 2000,
and Frankel and Froot, 1986), which is similar to our β, very challenging to estimate. Our assumption
is a reasonable shortcut for this particular context which makes estimation straightforward.
17Alternatively, though we do not consider this likely for the Euro area, an inflation bias may be
present, implying a wedge between the official inflation target and the actual equilibrium value, and
this is imperfectly observed by experts. This latter possibility is in the spirit of Barro and Gordon














• Cohesion credibility σCB refers to the standard deviation of inflation across coun-
tries. The smaller, the better.
• Anchoring credibility refers to the proportion of agents β who believe H0. If
the proportion drops, moving up along the front edge of the credibility cube,
credibility is lost.
It turns out to be useful to split the countries into core and peripheral groups, since
the evolution of credibility is very different for the two.
5 Estimates of Credibility
5.1 An Estimable Form of the Model
Our measures of credibility in this section use a restricted form of the following equation,
derived from equation (2):
πit = θ1DtPi + θ2 (1−Dt)Pi + θ3 (1− Pi)Dt + θ4 (1−Dt) (1− Pi)
+
θ5
1− θ6Dt − θ7DtPi
πenit +
θ8
1− θ9Dt − θ10DtPi
ygapit + ηit; (6)
i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T,
where i is a country index and t a time index. The variables πit, π
en
it , and ygapit are
respectively inflation, energy price inflation and the output gap in country i in period
t. Since the dummy Dt switches on in the Great Recession (Sept 2008 onwards) and
the dummy Pi switches on for the ‘periphery’ of the currency union (Portugal, Ireland,
Italy, Greece and Spain), we can interpret the coefficients as a two dimensional matrix
of Core/Periphery and Pre/Post crisis, giving four states of nature: Core pre-crisis,
Core post-crisis, Periphery pre-crisis and Periphery post-crisis. This matrix, along with
descriptions of the parameters’ meanings, is presented in Table 1.
(Insert Table 1 here)
We used quarterly data from 2001 Q1 to 2014 Q4. The Euro was phased in between
1999 (electronic payments) and 2002 (notes and coins) and so we judged that the entry
of Greece into the Euro zone in March 2001 was a reasonable cue.
Inflation (π) and energy price growth relative to trend (πen) are both four-quarter-
ended.19 The output gap is a deviation of the log of GDP from an OLS trend. As a
robustness check, we also obtained an annual output gap from the OECD, and smoothed
it. We use our own quarterly series (the OLS residuals) but, as we shall see, the main














results are robust to using the smoothed annual output gap figures.20 As Figure 4
shows, movements in the two output gaps align fairly closely for most countries:
(Insert Figure 4 here)
Since (6) is non-linear in parameters, non-linear least squares is used for estimation.
Results for five models are presented in Table 2. The last two columns are sensitivity
analyses, where the model is run: without energy prices, and, with the smoothed OECD
annual output gap (with energy prices put back in).
(Insert Table 2 here)
Model 1 in Table 2 provides estimates of parameters as they appear in (6). In order
to be consistent with the IE theoretical model, we first need to verify that any coeffi-
cients of exogenous variables change by the same proportion when anchoring credibility
is lost. This in turn implies testing θ6 = θ9 and θ7 = θ10. F-tests result in acceptance
of both of these hypotheses (p = 0.84 and p = 0.71,respectively). Hence these two re-
strictions were imposed. Also, 2 percentage points were subtracted from the dependent
variable to give a new regression equation (Model 2) in which the first four coefficients
represent departures from the official target of 2 percent:
πit − 2.0 = θ1DtPi + θ2 (1−Dt)Pi + θ3 (1− Pi)Dt + θ4 (1−Dt) (1− Pi)
+
θ5
1− θ9Dt − θ10DtPi
πenit +
θ8
1− θ9Dt − θ10DtPi
ygapit + ηit.
An F-test of the joint hypothesis θ3 = θ4 = 0 was applied to Model 2, and these
restrictions were accepted (p = 0.8143). Hence these restrictions were imposed, leading
to Model 3. The regression equation corresponding to Model 3 is as follows:
πit − 2.0 = θ1DtPi + θ2 (1−Dt)Pi
+
θ5
1− θ9Dt − θ10DtPi
πenit +
θ8
1− θ9Dt − θ10DtPi
ygapit + ηit. (7)
We also assume 50 percent of agents target the null pre-crisis (represented by the
parameter β), and then calculate the percentage remaining after the crisis.
20Data was collected from 1998, and four-quarter ended price changes therefore began in 1999. Initial
attempts to map the annual output gap data from the OECD onto the quarterly OLS residuals of log
output onto a linear trend from 1998 onwards ran into serious difficulties when the OLS residuals
over 1998-2000 showed large negative gaps in Austria, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands, while the OECD ones showed positive or only marginally negative ones. In the end we
used OLS residuals from 2001 based on a regression of log output on trend over the whole period,
namely 1998-2014. These matched smoothed OECD annual figures well, where the smoothing was
accomplished by letting the annual figure apply in each quarter of the year and then linking the
December quarters by a linear trend. As can be seen in the chart, smoothing in this way seemed to













In the context of (7), whose estimates appear as Model 3 in Table 2, we briefly
weigh into a controversy about energy prices. We earlier claimed that energy prices
are important for European inflation, but the question is how important. Following
the oil price shocks in the 1970s, it has been standard to include oil or energy prices
into Phillips curves worldwide (as Laubach and Williams, 2003, do in the US case). A
range of justifications have been offered, as outlined by LeBlanc and Chinn (2004). An
energy price shock might be inflationary via increasing input costs, or it may increase
investment uncertainty, or it may reduce real money balances, or it may operate as a
relative price shock leading to costly resource reallocation among sectors. All of these
rely on a high degree of transmission of external shocks to the relevant CPI components.
This is plausible in Europe because recent fine-grained research on disaggregated prices
suggests that the CPI component of energy (around 10 per cent for Germany, Franc
and Italy (OECD 2012)) is very responsive to oil price changes (Alvarez et al., 2006).
Cuñado and Perez (2003) concur, finding a permanent effect on inflation of oil price
changes.
Nevertheless, LeBlanc and Chinn (2004) caution that the size of the impact in
Europe may have declined over recent decades. There are two special factors that in
the past have been used to explain a heightened marginal impact of energy prices on
European inflation. First, labour unions have historically been more powerful in Europe
than in the United States, with unions more likely to extract higher wage concessions in
response to rising consumer prices for energy. Second, since product market competition
has been less intense, European producers may have been more likely to pass along wage
costs to consumers in the form of higher prices. Many believe these special factors are
no longer so important, implying a smaller energy price effect.
With regard to our preferred model (Model 3), we first note the plausibility of
LeBlanc and Chinn’s (2004) account of decline. Prior to the crisis, where we assume
a steady state, the marginal impact of energy prices (θ5) is estimated to be around 3
per cent, which is not too far from LeBlanc and Chinn’s suggested benchmark of the
energy share of CPI (10 per cent), but low enough to render their account of declining
union and increased product market flexibility plausible.21
We then estimated a Phillips curve without energy prices as a robustness test, even
though this restriction would be rejected in our preferred Model 3.22 We tested down
the model to arrive at Model 4, which reassuringly gives the same broad narrative.
Prior to the crisis, the countries in the periphery had underlying inflation at around
one percentage point above the ECB target, and this was subsequently brought back
to line after the crisis. Furthermore, agent’s anchoring onto the target fell by around
79 per cent across the whole of Europe (core and periphery), which is approximately
the same as the decline in the periphery in our preferred model.
Naturally, it is hard to argue for Model 4 econometrically since the restriction needed
to create it is rejected by the data. Relatedly, the adjusted R2, at 0.24, is less than half
the adjusted R2 for our preferred model (0.57).
This is fortunate because Model 3 has the additional advantage that we can test
what must be assumed in Model 4. It will be recalled that the test for the operation
21It would be unreasonable in our framework to discount their suggestion on the basis of the higher
post-crisis parameter, since we have interpreted the rise as resulting from diminished anchoring.













of IE in the IE Phillips curve is that multiple parameters rise by the same proportion
when agents abandon the null, and clearly this test needs more than one explanatory
variable. Model 4 only has the output gap and therefore the IE interpretation of the
Phillips curve is not falsifiable in the same way that it is for Model 3.
Another robustness test concerns the output gap. In Model 5 we repeat our analysis
with the quarterly output gap based on smoothing the annual data. The results are in
line with Model 3 and the adjusted R2 is virtually identical. Interestingly, estimates
of loss of anchoring credibility are somewhat smaller in this model. The core sees a
decline in β of 55 percent and the periphery sees a decline of 65 percent. We have a
preference for Model 3, however, because a quarterly series for the output gap seems
the most appropriate measure for a quarterly model. The robustness check is useful,
however, both because the output gap confirms the broad shape of our own quarterly
output gap and, as we have just seen, because the results are so similar.
A very useful feature of our specification is that information about inflation expec-
tations is implicitly obtained using a single equation with observed inflation on the left
hand side. This was made possible by our reliance on the model of Carroll (2003) who,
using household survey data, showed that expectations are best summarized as infre-
quent rational expectations. This in turn made an inflation equation a natural home
for inferential expectations (Menzies and Zizzo, 2009) which allowed us to build the IE
Phillips curve. Thus, we did not need to include survey data or uncover inflation expec-
tations from financial data, for example by deconstructing yield curves or comparing
inflation-indexed bonds to non-indexed bonds. This opens up a host of possibilities
when such data is not readily available or of poor quality.
5.2 Measuring Credibility
We are now in possession of our estimates for official targeting credibility and anchoring
credibility, and we will use Model 3 to assess credibility in the Euro area following the
crisis. With regards to the official target, the core countries never move significantly
away from 2 percent, the officially announced target. The peripheral countries get closer,
starting one percentage point above and ending up half a percentage point below the
official target. Both results appear in the top row of Table 3.
(Insert Table 3 here)
With regard to anchoring credibility, the core countries saw a decline in the an-
choring coefficient of nearly 70 per cent, and the peripheral countries saw a decline of
nearly 80 per cent. Assuming β starts out at 50 per cent, as a steady-state value, the
estimates translate to a decline of 50 to 16 percent in the former case (the core) and 50
to 11 percent in the latter case (the periphery).
Finally, with regards to coherence credibility, we calculated the cross-country stan-
dard deviation of inflation for the core and periphery countries on a quarterly basis,
creating a time series over the full sample. The change is insignificant over the crisis
for core (dashed) countries, but significant for peripheral countries (p = 0.0645 and
p = 0.0071). In the periphery, it steps from 0.7678 to 1.1801, but in the core the













(Insert Figure 5 here)
Our main results are summarized in two credibility cubes below, where the axes
are defined in the same way as they were introduced. The standout result of policy
relevance is that there is a lowering of anchoring credibility by well over one half in
both the core and periphery.
(Insert Figure 6 here)
6 Discussion and Conclusion
We have shown the usefulness of considering credibility along three dimensions: official
target credibility, cohesion credibility and anchoring credibility.
The IE-based Phillips curve provides a plausible mechanism why some explanators
in regressions can seem to be unimportant most of the time, but then, as if suddenly,
they become a major driver of a crisis. That is, equations like (2) have the property that
whenever agents become detached from a null belief (the status quo), they attach more
importance to other sources of information. Our IE model delivers an endogenous and
accentuated marginal impact, relying on the insight that regression variables are not
just causal factors—they are also, by virtue of this fact, sources of information for those
who must form expectations about the LHS variable. If the explanators in question are
normally small, and undetectable by econometric means, they can become significant
in a crisis, as agents turn away from trusting the central bank, or some other source of
a status quo, towards their own (or experts’) analysis of information. In this way our
model departs significantly from other models that combine rational expectations with
näıve expectations, and turns towards what Vines and Wills (2018) sense is a realistic
property for macroeconomic models during crises. It is an innovation that ought to
prove useful in many other applications and contexts.
Our analysis of the Euro area has shown that, as a result of the Great Recession and
the sovereign debt crisis, there is no evidence for an erosion of official target credibility
in the Euro area: the ECB’s official target of (just below) 2 percent is still credible in
the sense that H0 agents believe the central bank will achieve this.
However, despite these positives, we have found evidence of an erosion of anchoring
credibility, not only in the periphery of the Euro area. The estimation of anchoring
credibility, using only a single reduced-form equation, was made possible by incorpo-
rating IE into a standard macroeconomic model of aggregate supply. In our preferred
Model 3 the loss is 70 per cent in the core, and in our next most preferred Model 5 it
is 55 per cent.
Our result is consistent with Natoli and Sigalotti (2017) who, after constructing a
new indicator of inflation expectations anchoring, argue that the risk of de-anchoring
in the Euro area rose significantly after the GFC, and remains high and volatile to this
day, while inflation expectations in the US and the UK remain firmly anchored.23 But
23Mehrotra and Yetman (2018a,b) study long-run inflation expectations using forecast behaviour













the firmest backing comes from Dovern and Kenny (2017) who, studying individual
density forecasts from the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters, state that:
“the level of long-term inflation expectations remains aligned with the
ECB’s quantitative definition of price stability. However, the shifts in higher
moments indicate a change in the degree to which inflation expectations are
anchored, i.e. in how tightly they are anchored at that level.”
Similar findings were presented by Scharnagl and Stapf (2011), using a different
methodology and data set, as well as van der Cruijsen and Demertzis (2011) who find
that, on average, expectations of national inflation rates appear to have become less
anchored than expectations of Euro area average inflation. Buono and Formai (2018),
too, found that Euro area inflation expectations became less anchored post-GFC.
A theoretical model, broadly consistent with the above results, is presented by
Busetti et al. (2017). They analyze how a prolonged period of subdued price de-
velopments may induce de-anchoring of inflation expectations from the central bank’s
inflation target. In their small-scale New Keynesian model agents form expectations
using adaptive learning in which a sequence of deflationary shocks elicits two responses,
a reduction in agents’ perception of the inflation target as well as in the share of agents
selecting a näıve, backward-looking forecasting model.
We thus conclude that beliefs about the European Central Bank’s inflation target
have increasingly converged to the official 2 percent target as the actual target. This
was always accepted (in our sample) in the core, but prior to the crisis agents in the
periphery believed the ECB acquiesced to something more than 2 percent, and after
the crisis they believed the ECB would acquiesce to something a little less. However,
while it is widely believed that the ECB targets (close to) 2 percent, attachment to
this target has weakened, particularly in countries which have been or are under finan-
cial and fiscal stress. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in Greece, but our
results are applicable to the periphery countries more generally.24 We leave to future
research the task of detailing mechanisms that connect financial and fiscal stress to
the loss in anchoring credibility, a problem of increasing importance for the periphery
countries, especially Italy. Attachment to the ECB’s policies, especially its inflation
target, plausibly depends on the prospect of each country remaining in the European
Monetary Union. So, while the retention of official target and cohesion credibility will
be welcomed by proponents of the Euro project, the loss of anchoring credibility in the
more tightly anchored over time’, yet ‘the level of the anchor has fallen’. In Mehrotra and Yetman
(2018b) the authors find that, ‘the estimated anchor of inflation forecasts is close to the announced
inflation target’ and ‘any deviations between the estimated anchor and the target tend to be short
lived.’ While interesting, their results and ours cannot be readily compared because we are comparing
behaviour of inflation expectations in Europe since the Great Recession in 2008, whereas they are
generalizing about worldwide inflation targeting since 1990.
24An interesting question, as suggested by one referee, would be to test for asymmetries, whereby
inflation falling below target differs from inflation rising above target in its effects. The Euro area
may not be the best area to test for this, however, given its relatively short history and the lack of
variation in the national and Euro area inflation series on both sides of the ECB’s official inflation
target. Indeed, it is noteworthy that in our preferred model the core is never far away from target
and the periphery is really only away from target prior to the GFC (being only 0.5 under the target is
arguably pretty much on target). Unfortunately, there does not exist enough data to test this question,













financially weaker countries still generates some uncertainty for the continued existence
of the common currency.
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Table 1: Matrix of Model Parameters
P = 0 Core P = 1 Periphery
D = 0 Pre D = 1 Post D = 0 Pre D = 1 Post
Predicted inflation θ4 θ3 θ2 θ1
when πen = ygap = 0
Impact of energy
price inflation on θ5 θ5/ (1− θ6) θ5 θ5/ (1− θ6 − θ7)
inflation
Impact of output gap θ8 θ8/(1−θ9) θ8 θ8/ (1− θ9 − θ10)
on inflation
Table 2: Nonlinear Least Squares Estimates of 5 Models
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5
Dependentvariable π π − 2.0 π − 2.0 π − 2.0 π − 2.0
Output gap ols resid. ols resid. ols resid. ols resid. OECD
θ1 1.541*** -0.464** -0.463**
(0.215) (0.206) (0.205)
θ2 3.080*** 1.071*** 1.076*** 1.024*** 1.029***





θ5 0.034** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0 imposed 0.049***





θ8 0.021 0.023*** 0.022** 0.033* 0.052***
(0.020) (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.008)
θ9 0.595 0.668*** 0.687*** 0.785*** 0.552***
(0.431) (0.086) (0.085) (0.083) (0.075)
θ10 0.196 0.099** 0.091** 0.105*
(0.267) (0.034) (0.032) (0.057)
n 672 672 672 672 672
R2 0.8760 0.6042 0.6033 0.3032 0.6320
Adjusted R2 0.8748 0.5682 0.5672 0.2398 0.5985
Notes: Non-linaear least squares estimates of five models. Standard errors clustered by
country. *** strongly significant (p<0.01); ** significant (p<0.05); * marginally significant














Table 3: Numerical Estimates of Parameters Listed in Table 1
P = 0 Core P = 1 Periphery
D = 0 Pre D = 1 Post D = 0 Pre D = 1 Post
Predicted inflation 2 2 3.07 1.53
when πen = ygap = 0 (0.23) (0.21)
Impact of energy 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.14
price inflation (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.02)
Impact of output gap 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.10
(0.007) (0.017) (0.007) (0.017)
Anchor onto null β = 0.50 β (1− θ6) = 0.16 β = 0.50 β (1− θ6 − θ7) = 0.11
(0.04) (0.03)













Figure 1: χ2 Distribution
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Figure 5: Cross-Country Standard Deviations of Inflation
Figure 6: Changes in Credibility Mapped Into the Credibility Cube
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